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CONNIE DE LA VEGA*
I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Hoffman that the most promising
use of international human rights law is as an aid in interpreting federal
and state civil liberties and civil rights laws. As I and other members of
Human Rights Advocates point out in an article published in the Texas
International Law Journal,I from which much of my talk today is drawn,
judges may invoke international law in much the same way and for the
same reasons that they refer to legislative history.
I. Areas of Application
I would like to add to Professor Hoffman's list of areas in which it may be
useful to use international law to provide additional protections to Califor-
nia residents. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 5
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 7 both
provide: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." This protection is much broader than
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and covers persons
being detained for treatment such as those who are being held in mental
institutions.
Second, in addition to more explicit prohibitions against discrimination,
there are specific provisions covering rights of women which would be help-
ful in expanding women's rights. For example, article 10(2) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights states:
Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period
before and after childbirth. During such period, working mothers should be
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.
There are also some provisions that may be helpful in dealing with juve-
nile justice cases. As an example, article 10(2)(B) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights could have been cited in arguing against
proposed legislation to lower the age that juveniles in California may be
tried as adults from fourteen to sixteen.
There may be many more areas to add to this list. These can only be
developed as people read the international documents and become familiar
with their provisions.
*Ms. de la Vega is a managing attorney of the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, and a
member of the Board of Human Rights Advocates, an organization devoted to the promotion
of the use of international human rights law in domestic and international forums.
'Burke, Coliver, de la Vega, and Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights
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In addition to using human rights law as an interpretive device, certain
provisions may be invoked as arguably binding on state and federal courts
either as treaty law or customary law. It is to these two uses that I shall
address my remarks.
I. Use of Treaties
A. Rules of Construction
A treaty becomes the supreme law of the land, of equal dignity with fed-
eral statutes, upon signature of the president and the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate. 2 Courts should attempt to construe a treaty and a
statute on the same subject so as to give effect to both.3 In particular, courts
should construe treaties "in a broad and liberal spirit, and when two con-
structions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it
and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."' 4 However,
where irreconciliable conflicts between treaty provisions and other United
States laws do arise, they are to be resolved pursuant to well-established
rules. First, a treaty may not infringe upon the provisons of the U.S. Con-
stitution.5 Second, if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, the most recent
prevails.6 And third, if a treaty and state law conflict, the treaty controls.7
B. Se/f-Executing Treaties
Once you determine that the U.S. is party to a treaty that arguably con-
trols an issue in your case, the next question to tackle is whether the treaty
is self-executing. Only a self-executing treaty is judicially enforceable with-
out implementing legislation.8 Various tests have been developed to assist
in the determination of whether or not a treaty is self-executing. One test
asks whether the treaty "operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision."9 A second looks to the "intent of the parties" reflected in the
treaty's words, and, if the words are unclear, in the circumstances surround-
ing the treaty's execution.' 0 Professor Riesenfeld has proposed a three-step
inquiry that would establish a treaty provision to be self-executing if (1) the
treaty concerns the rights or duties of individuals; (2) neither the U.S. nor
other parties retain discretion to determine if and when to give the words of
2U.S. CONST., art. I1 § 2, cl.2.
'Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
'Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
'Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
16 (1957) (plurality opinion).
'Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 18 n.134.7Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35.
'Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 pet.) 253, 253 (1829).
'Id
"Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933).
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the treaty domestic effect; and (3) no congressional action is required to
fulfill the provision's obligations. "
For example, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights' 2 that I mentioned before provides that "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." The U.S. is not a party to this treaty although it was signed by
President Carter. If the U.S. were a party to the treaty, a strong argument
could be made that article 7 is self-executing: it confers rights on individu-
als; from its language, it appears that it was intended to be given immediate
'domestic effect; and it does not call for any specific legislative action that
would be a prerequisite to its enforcement.
On the other hand, article 11(2) of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights provides an example of a provision that
probably would not be found to be wholly self-executing. Article 11(2)
declares that "The states party to the present covenant, recognizing the fun-
damental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take individually
and through international cooperation, the measures, including specific
programs, which are needed." While the article would establish as funda-
mental the right to be free from hunger, and therefore, arguably, could be
invoked to prohibit a state party from actively interfering with that right,
the provision calling for specific programs would not be self-executing since
its implementation would require congressional action. Similarly, any
treaty provision that requires congressional appropriation of funds would
not be self-executing.
The United Nations Charter and the Treaty on Refugees are the only
significant human rights treaties that the U.S. has ratified. The U.N. Char-
ter's most important human rights clauses are contained in articles 55 and
56. Article 55 provides that "the United Nations shall promote. . . univer-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56
provides that "[ajll members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in Article 55."
Extensive debate has focused on whether article 56 is self-executing. In a
frequently cited 1952 opinion, Sei Fujii v. California,13 the California
Supreme Court rejected the argument that articles 55 and 56 are self-
executing. The statement is dictum, and in any event, scholars have noted
"Riesenfeld, "The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable German
Judgment," 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1971).
"
2Supp. No. 16 at 52. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR.
'138 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
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that, in light of the evolving nature of international human rights law, the
question would likely be settled differently today.
14
C. Nature of Rights and Obligations
Once you have proved to the court's satisfaction that the treaty provision
you are seeking to have enforced is self-executing, you will have to establish
the nature of the rights and obligations created by that provision. Cer-
tainly, neither article 55 nor 56 is very specific. Arguably, the International
Bill of Human Rights-in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights-provides an authoritative interpretation of articles 55 and 56.15 In
any event, whether authoritative or not, the instruments which comprise the
International Bill of Human Rights provide the best guidelines available as
to how to interpret the charter's human rights clauses.
I have a few cautionary points to make concerning the use of the above
outlined argument. First, cases in which the argument is made must be
chosen carefully. As Professor Hoffman noted, we do not want to make bad
precedent. Even were we to be victorious in California, any decision that
depended upon the application of treaty law would be reviewable by the
federal courts.
Second, although it has been suggested that the various instruments that
comprise the International Bill of Human Rights may be used to interpret
the obligations and rights created by articles 55 and 56, in practice, it is
likely to be extremely difficult to persuade a court that these rights include
any economic, social or cultural rights not already recognized in U.S. law.
Article 2 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states
that each state party undertakes to take steps to the maximum of its avail-
able resources with a view towards progressively achieving the realization
of the rights enumerated in the covenant. The inclusion of the term "pro-
gressively achieving" has been interpreted by commentators to impose no
immediately binding obligations. However, it may credibly be argued that
the term does proscribe backsliding, that is, abolishing rights, and programs
that had the effect of implementing those rights, once established. For
example, where cutbacks in programs that provide basic services to dis-
abled people result in significant deterioration of their rights to food, shel-
ter, education, medical care or human dignity, an argument may be made
that such cutbacks violate the provision requiring progressive achievement.
"See, e.g., Schlueter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations
Charter, 61 CAL. L. REV. 110, 162n. 291 (1973). See also 19 TEX. INT'L L.J., supra n.1, at
303-04.
" 18 TEX. INT'L L.J., supra n.l, at 305-08, and cases cited thereat.
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III. Use of Customary International Law
International human rights law may also be enforced through customary
international law. It is an accepted principle that customary international
law is "part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."' 16
Courts face two major issues when considering whether they may apply
customary international law to protect individual rights: whether customary
international law may be invoked by an individual in a federal or state
court, and how to establish that a particular right is protected by customary
international law.
A. Invocation by Individuals
In the leading case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,'7 two Paraguayan citizens
brought an action in New York against a former police official from Para-
guay for the wrongful death by torture in Paraguay of a member of their
family. The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 USC section 1331 (fed-
eral question) and under the Alien Tort Claims Act,' 8 which provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." In ruling that the district court did have jurisdiction
to hear the case, the Second Circuit found that official torture is now pro-
hibited in customary international law, just as piracy and slave trading have
been prohibited since an earlier era. The Second Circuit declared that
"courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." '9
B. Establishing Protectable Rights
To determine whether a prohibition against torture is currently part of
customary international law, the Filartiga court applied the traditional
analysis enunciated in United States v. Smith 20: "The law of nations . ..
may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public laws; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judi-
cial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."' 2' For the "works of
jurists" the Filartiga court relied on affidavits of four "distinguished inter-
national scholars" who stated unanimously that the law of nations abso-
'"The Paquetelabana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See 18 TEx. INT'L L.J., supra n.I, at 315.
1'630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
"28 U.S.C. § 1350.
"Id at 881.




lutely prohibits the use of torture. For "judicial opinions" the court cited
only a 1978 decision of the European Court of Human Rights that inter-
preted the European convention's prohibition against torture.
22
Most importantly, the court relied on "the usage of nations" which it
found to be evidenced in several ways. First, it found evidence of the exist-
ence of a right to be free from torture in articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights23 and the U.N. Decla-
ration on Torture.24 Second, it looked to express language in three multi-
lateral treaties (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 25
the American Convention 26 and the European Convention),27 and to anti-
torture prescriptions in the laws of many nations and general condemnation
of torture by all nations as indicative of "the modem usage and practice of
nations." The court added that "the fact that the prohibition of torture is
often honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm
of international law."'28 Finally, the court relied on a Justice Department
memorandum, and on a State Department report finding that "there now
exists an international consensus that recognizes basic human rights and
obligations owed by all governments to their citizens." '29
I have described the Filartiga brief at such length because it provides a
clear example of how customary international law may be applied in
domestic courts. Commentators have noted that several jurisdictional
issues not raised in Filartiga may limit its precedential value. Nevertheless,
it is ground-breaking in its recognition of the power of customary interna-
tional law to confer judicially enforceable rights on individuals, and on
clarifying the manner in which customary international human rights law is
to be ascertained in U.S. courts. It is an exciting case; its applicability to
other actions is being tested in several currently pending cases.
Other recent cases that have mentioned the possible applicability of cus-
tomary international law in conferring rights on individuals, while, how-
ever, relying on international law only as an interpretive device, include
Rodriguez v. Wilkinson 30 and Lareau v. Manson.31
2 2Ireland v. U.K., (1978) Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Ct. of Human
Rights).
23G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (adopted unanimously).
"'Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res.
3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34), U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
2 See note 12, supra, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
2 American Convention on Human Rights, done November 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. N. 36 at 1
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) and R. LILLICH AND F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1979).
"European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
done November 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. N. 5, reprinted in R. LILLICH and F. NEWMAN, id
2630 F.2d at 884, n.15.
'lid at 884.
30654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
"507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modified 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
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There are several difficulties in urging that international law be applied
either as treaty law or customary international law. All I have attempted to
do here is to outline how the arguments may be made. I expect that Judge
Linde will explore these difficulties at greater length.
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